

PROLEPTIC COMPOSITION IN THE *REPUBLIC*, OR WHY BOOK 1 WAS NEVER A SEPARATE DIALOGUE

Old scholarly myths die hard. It was K. F. Hermann, the discoverer of the ‘Socratic period’ in Plato’s development, who first proposed (in 1839) that Book 1 of the *Republic* must originally have been an earlier, independent dialogue on justice, parallel to the *Laches* on courage, the *Euthyphro* on piety, and the *Charmides* on temperance.¹ Hermann also introduced the separatist enterprise of analysing the rest of the *Republic* into three or four distinct compositional stages. Analytical proposals of this sort were then formulated by a number of other scholars, including Krohn, Usener, and Rohde.² The notion of an earlier, partial publication seemed to be supported by two bits of external evidence: a statement in Aulus Gellius that ‘about two books’ (*duo fere libri*) of Plato’s *Republic* were the first to appear;³ and a number of striking parallels on the community of women between *Republic* 5 and Aristophanes’ *Ekklesiazousai*, produced c. 392 B.C.⁴

These various separatist proposals have now largely collapsed under their own weight. Furthermore, stylometric studies indicate that the language of Books 2–10 is sufficiently uniform for there to be no reason to suppose any major break in continuity of composition.⁵ However, these same stylometric studies point to a significant difference between the language of Book 1 and that of the other nine books. Hence the hypothesis of an early version of Book 1 composed as a separate ‘Socratic’ dialogue, now baptized the *Thrasymachus*, has survived the demise of the other nineteenth-century analytical theories. This hypothesis is still represented in our own day, and has even been regarded with favour in one of the latest and most authoritative publications on Plato’s early work.⁶

Now there is no way to prove the non-existence of this hypothetical dialogue. What I hope to show is that there is no serious evidence in favour of the hypothesis, and overwhelming evidence that Book 1 as we have it was composed to be what Plato

¹ K. F. Hermann, *Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie* (Heidelberg, 1839), pp. 538–40.

² For critical discussion of Krohn and other separatists, see E. Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, ii.1⁴, 556–62, and H. Raeder, *Platons philosophische Entwicklung* (Leipzig, 1905), pp. 287ff.

³ Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Att.* 14.3: ‘quod Xenophon incluto illi operi Platonis, quod de optimo statu reipublicae... scriptum est, lectis ex eo duobus fere libris, qui primi in vulgus exierant, opposuit contra conscripsitque [etc.].’ Gellius’ source is unknown, and there are problems with his claim that the *Cyropaedia* is a response to the first part of the *Republic*. See Wilamowitz, *Platon* (2nd ed., Berlin, 1920), ii.181f.

⁴ For full discussion, see Adam’s Appendix I to Book 5, in *The ‘Republic’ of Plato* (Cambridge, 1902), i.345–55. Adam concludes that Plato probably had Aristophanes in mind when he wrote Book 5 (p. 354).

⁵ See Ritter’s results summarized in L. Brandwood, *The Chronology of Plato’s Dialogues* (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 67–73. There has, however, been a revival of the analytical enterprise in H. Thesleff, *Studies in Platonic Chronology* (Helsinki, 1982), pp. 101ff.

⁶ G. Vlastos, *Socrates* (Cambridge and Ithaca, 1991), p. 250. According to Friedländer (*Plato* ii.305 n. 1), the name *Thrasymachus* was given to the hypothetical dialogue by F. Dümmler in 1895.

himself calls it, a prelude (*prooimion*) to the rest of the work (2.357a2). At issue here are two points of wider significance for the interpretation of Plato: 1. an insight into Plato's use of proleptic composition as an expository device that is characteristic of the artistic structure of the *Republic*, and that (I would claim) can be found in an analogous form in earlier works, including some typically 'Socratic' dialogues; and 2. the philosophical connection between the *Republic* and earlier dialogues such as the *Gorgias* and the dialogues of definition, for which Book 1 serves as a kind of résumé or reminder.

I

The arguments in favour of an earlier, independent composition of Book 1 are of two kinds: 1. the stylometric evidence, to be considered in a moment, and 2. the similarities of form and content between Book 1 and earlier works, above all the *Gorgias* for content and the dialogues of definition for form.⁷ These similarities are unmistakable, and they call for some explanation. A biographical hypothesis of earlier composition, which in the absence of external documentation can be neither confirmed nor disproved, is properly an explanation of last resort. It is surely preferable to look for an interpretation of Book 1 that regards it as an integral part of Plato's plan for the *Republic*. The natural assumption, for a work as carefully written as the *Republic*, is that the more striking features of the parts are to be understood in terms of some overall design for the work as a whole. Since the distinctively 'Socratic' character of the discussion in Book 1 is one of its most striking features, it is natural to ask why this form was selected by Plato for the prelude to his major work. And this question would need to be asked even if we were to accept the hypothesis of an earlier *Thrasymachus*.

First, however, we must deal with the evidence from stylometry, since many scholars have treated this as if it could replace the missing documentary support for the hypothesis of early composition. Wilamowitz, for example, thought that the statistics of von Arnim and others showed that 'the language of the first book not only differs from the others but belongs with the very early dialogues around the *Laches*'.⁸ However, Wilamowitz recognized that Book 1 as it stands is so closely connected to the rest of the *Republic* that, if there had ever been an independent *Thrasymachus*, 'we no longer have it, but only its reworking as part of the *Republic*'.⁹ Wilamowitz proposed the alternative hypothesis that Book 1 contains material from an unfinished early work, which Plato had abandoned in order to write the *Gorgias* instead. Friedländer follows Wilamowitz in leaving both possibilities open, but regards it as 'practically certain', for reasons of 'form and content as well as on the grounds of verbal statistics', that Book 1 was originally composed as a separate dialogue 'carefully planned and far advanced in the mind of its author as an integral part of the early group of aporetic dialogues'.¹⁰

⁷ Friedländer (ii.50ff.) gives some other arguments, less serious in my opinion: for example, that the conversation of Book 1 begins too late in the day. 'If the *Republic* had been planned as a whole, the discussion probably would have begun early in the morning, as in the *Laws*' (p. 51). As if Plato, when he supposedly re-used an earlier work, could not have made such a change if he had regarded it as of any importance.

⁸ Wilamowitz, *Platon* ii.181.

⁹ Ibid. 184. Cf. vol. i.209-11.

¹⁰ P. Friedländer, *Plato*, ii (New York, 1964), p. 50.

The situation with regard to statistics is much easier to survey now than it was for Wilamowitz and Friedländer, as a result of the sober critical work of Leonard Brandwood. It turns out that von Arnim overstated the quality of his results, and scholars like Wilamowitz and Friedländer were simply taken in.¹¹ The fundamental error lay, I believe, in attempting to establish a sequence for all the dialogues, on the basis of statistical comparisons. What emerges from Brandwood's survey is the same conclusion one could have drawn a hundred years ago, from Campbell's work taken together with Ritter's earliest results and the hiatus observations made by Blass. By 1888 these studies of stylistic variation had succeeded in dividing Plato's dialogues into three chronologically distinct groups. But such studies were not, and still are not, able to establish a relative order between the dialogues within any one group. Every attempt to order the dialogues individually has failed to reach general acceptance, and, I submit, for good reason. In the course of a half-century of writing dialogues, Plato's style seems to have changed decisively on two occasions: once when he composed the *Republic* – a work on an entirely new scale – and again when he began systematically to avoid hiatus (between the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*). But stylistic changes are not uniform and continuous enough over a lifetime to reflect the order of composition of individual works, some of them quite short and several of them, perhaps, in progress at roughly the same time. Since such attempts at a linear arrangement regularly fail, they tend to bring the stylometric method itself into disrepute and thus to undermine scholarly confidence in what I take to be the one solid achievement of stylometry: the division into three groups. This result was reached a century ago, and has been repeatedly confirmed in more recent studies.¹²

The *Republic* as a whole belongs to Group II, together with the *Phaedrus*, *Parmenides*, and *Theaetetus*. But stylometric studies have also shown that the language of Book I has more affinity with the dialogues in Group I than do the other books. More exactly, Book I has fewer marks of Plato's late style. For example, reporting the results of Ritter's fundamental work, Brandwood points out that of 43 criteria recognized as characteristic of the later style, Book I exhibits only 9, whereas the other books of the *Republic* show distinctly more. (The figures vary from 13 late traits in Book 2 to 22 in Books 5 and 9.) Still, Book I has more late traits than any

¹¹ Referring to von Arnim's second stylometric publication in 1912, on which Wilamowitz was relying, Brandwood (p. 220) quotes with approval Ritter's judgement that this 'immense amount of labour' was 'wasted'.

¹² The latest group (*Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Philebus*, *Timaeus-Critias*, *Laws*) was identified by Campbell in 1867, independently identified by Blass in 1874, then again independently by Dittenberger in 1881, and finally confirmed by Ritter in 1888. (See the report in W. Lutoslawski, *The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic* (London, 1897), pp. 84ff., 101, 103–5, 124f.) The place of the *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, and *Theaetetus* in the middle group was recognized by Campbell in his original study, and confirmed by Ritter in 1888. (See Lutoslawski, pp. 93 and 122.) The only definitive result achieved after 1888 was the recognition that the *Parmenides* belongs to the same middle group, a discovery made independently by Campbell and von Arnim in 1896 (Lutoslawski, pp. 137f.).

For the current state of the question I rely on Brandwood (although he is more optimistic about the possibilities of a linear ordering). Thesleff (see n. 5 above) combines considerations of style and content, which tends to obscure the division into three groups. In the latest exercise in pure stylometry, *Recounting Plato* (Oxford, 1989), G. R. Ledger recognizes 'the sharp difference between early and late works' (p. 225), and his summary conclusions reflect the division into Groups II (*Republic-Phaedrus*) and III (*Philebus-Critias*), on pp. 224f. But this result is less perspicuous because of Ledger's (to my mind, misguided) attempt to obtain a linear sequence for all the dialogues.

earlier dialogue.¹³ So this particular set of data places Book 1 exactly where we expect to find it: between the early group and the other books of the *Republic*.

What Ritter's figures suggest is that *Republic* 1 might be counted either as the first member of Group II or as one of the latest members of Group I, together with the *Phaedo*, *Cratylus* and *Lysis*. Rather similar conclusions were reached by von Arnim in his first study, published in 1896.¹⁴

The linguistic differences between *Republic* 1 and the rest of the work are undeniable, but some of them may have little or no chronological significance. Whatever its date, Book 1 was clearly designed to resemble an aporetic, 'Socratic' dialogue. Books 2–10 are quite different in form, much more consistently dogmatic. The conversational tone of Book 1 is animated and often polemical, as in earlier works; the tone of 2–10 is didactic, as in the later dialogues. Some stylistic variation must reflect this fact. For example, if *πάνυ γε* preponderates over *πάνυ μὲν οὖν* as a formula of reply in Book 1 (16 occurrences to 5), whereas the ratio is reversed in the later books (40 to 64), that is probably because *πάνυ γε* is a more guarded affirmation, appropriate for an interlocutor who is waiting to see what comes next ('Yes – and so what?'), whereas *πάνυ μὲν οὖν* is the more unqualified 'Yes, of course,' of someone who is in full agreement with what has just been said. Is it surprising that instances of such enthusiastic assent should be more frequent for Glaucon and Adeimantus in 2–10 than for Polemarchus and Thrasymachus in Book 1?¹⁵

In sum, in so far as stylometry shows anything about the relative date of Book 1, it shows only that it was written before the other books. But that is scarcely news. Stylometry cannot possibly show *how much earlier* it was written. In particular, it cannot show that Book 1 was written at the same time as the dialogues of definition (*Laches*, *Charmides* and *Euthyphro*) rather than at the same time as *Symposium*, *Phaedo* and *Cratylus*. Scholars like Wilamowitz, who believed that this had been established, were deceived by von Arnim, who was self-deceived.

So we can safely ignore stylometry and turn to the question of aporetic form. Book 1 ends with Socrates' expression of dissatisfaction at the course of the conversation and the results achieved. He has gained no knowledge: 'for when I do not know what justice is, I can scarcely know whether it is really a virtue or not, and whether the person who has it is happy or not.' This obviously recalls the conclusion of the *Protagoras* and the central theme of the *Meno*, where Socrates insists that to know whether or not virtue is teachable one must first know what virtue is. In the following books of the *Republic*, Plato responds to this challenge both in regard to happiness and in regard to teachability. The account of justice in Books 2–4 shows in what sense it is a virtue and, in Books 4 and 9, how it is the essential feature of a happy life. Books 2–7 also show, at two levels, how virtue can be taught: civic virtue by means of purified music and gymnastic, philosophic virtue by mathematical and dialectical

¹³ The *Cratylus* has 8 late traits, the *Phaedo* 7, although each of these dialogues is almost twice as long as *Republic* 1 (which has 9 late traits). The *Lysis* also has 8 late traits. The variation for other members of Group I (from 3 late traits to 5) cannot be significant. Other members of Group II, on the other hand, all have a substantially larger number of late traits, like *Republic* 2–10: *Parmenides*, 17, *Phaedrus*, 21, *Theaetetus*, 25. See the data in Brandwood, pp. 66–74.

Unfortunately, Ledger does not provide separate statistics for *Republic* 1.

¹⁴ See Brandwood, pp. 107f. Von Arnim claimed (on slender grounds) that the *Lysis* was the latest dialogue in Group I, immediately preceded by *Laches*, *Republic* 1, *Phaedo*, and *Symposium*. The *Cratylus* was placed by him just before this group.

¹⁵ A similar observation was made by Raeder, *Platons philosophische Entwicklung*, p. 202. For a systematic attempt to explain the stylistic peculiarities of Book 1 in literary rather than chronological terms, see K. Vretska, 'Platonica III', *Wiener Studien* 71 (1958), 32–6.

studies giving access to the Form of the Good. Looking back from the *Republic* to the aporetic dialogues, we see that the *Republic* offers solutions to nearly all the aporias debated in the earlier works: the question of teachability; the attempts to define courage and temperance; the search for virtue understood as knowledge of good and evil, as a kind of wisdom that is beneficial both for the city and for the individual – knowledge that produces excellence in the soul as medicine produces health in the body. All this leads up to, and is completed by, the μέγιστον μάθημα, the greatest object of knowledge, the Form of the Good.¹⁶

The fit between the problems raised in the aporetic dialogues (*Protagoras*, *Meno*, and the three dialogues of definition) and the solutions proposed in the *Republic* is so tight, and the anticipations of later doctrine so numerous, that it is reasonable to suspect something that is difficult to prove: that these earlier dialogues were planned from the beginning as preparation for the theories to be proposed in the middle dialogues, and above all in the *Republic*. Whether or not they were so planned, however, there is no doubt that when Plato came to compose the *Republic*, he deliberately chose to connect it with these earlier works by the form of the dialogue with Polemarchus and Thrasymachus in Book 1, and by the explicit repetition at the end of this book of the principle of priority of definition.

Book 1 has many other features that seem designed to recall Plato's earlier dialogues. For example, one of the arguments against Polemarchus contains a distinct echo of a passage from the *Hippias Minor*; another defends the rejection of retaliation developed in the *Crito*.¹⁷ And of course the antimoralist position of Thrasymachus is a vivid reminder of Socrates' confrontation with Polus and Calicles in the *Gorgias*. Socrates' mode of argument in Book 1 is recognizably that of earlier works, relying as it does upon systematic ἐπαγωγή from the arts and crafts. If by 'Socratic' we mean the earlier dialogues from the *Hippias Minor* to the *Meno*, there is no question that Book 1 is consistently Socratic in its theme, in its method of argument, and in its reminiscences of earlier doctrine.

Does it follow from these parallels of form and content that Book 1 must have been written at an earlier period, before the innovations of the *Symposium* and the *Phaedo*? I see no basis for such an inference. If Plato is a conscious artist (and what writer was ever more acutely aware of his craft?), then it is reasonable to suppose that he deliberately created a Socratic dialogue as the prelude to his *magnum opus*. (This conclusion would hold even if, on the hypothesis which we have rejected, the material for this creation was taken from an earlier piece of work.) The real question is: why did he do so? Why did he introduce the grand theory of the *Republic* with an inconclusive Socratic dialogue?

I have already indicated what I take to be the most adequate answer: the *Republic* will offer solutions to many of the problems raised, but not resolved, in the earlier dialogues. Others have suggested a rather different reply: that Plato is now finally recognizing the limitations of the Socratic elenchus as a method for philosophy, and wants, in effect, to display that recognition by rejecting the results of Book 1 as unsatisfactory.¹⁸ But the connection can be interpreted in much less negative terms.

¹⁶ This is, I take it, the truth behind Jaeger's exaggerated claim that when Plato 'wrote the first words of his first Socratic dialogue, he knew the whole of which it was to be a part. The entelechy of the *Republic* can be quite clearly traced in the early dialogues.' *Paideia*, tr. G. Highet (Oxford, 1944), ii.96.

¹⁷ Compare *Rep.* 1.333e–334b with *Hi. Mi.* 365c–368a, and *Republic* 335b–336a with *Crito* 49a–c.

¹⁸ C. D. C. Reeve, *Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato's 'Republic'* (Princeton, 1988), pp. 22–4. Cf. T. Irwin, *Plato's Moral Theory* (Oxford, 1977), p. 184.

Book 1 is Socratic not because Plato is leaving the philosophy of the earlier dialogues behind, but because he wants to recall these discussions as vividly as possible, as background and context for his new undertaking. On the one hand he is going to repeat in the *Republic* what he tried, with limited success, to do in the *Gorgias*: defend the Socratic moral position against moral scepticism and anti-morality. That is why Thrasymachus must remind us of Polus and Callicles: he will revive the same moral challenge. On the other hand, Plato can now support his defence of morality with a new set of theories – the tripartite psychology, the theory of dialectic built upon the method of hypothesis, the doctrine of Forms, the theory of love based upon the Forms – theories which have been elaborately prepared in the dialogues of definition (conceived as the search for essences), in the *Meno*, the *Lysis*, the *Symposium* and the *Phaedo*. The climax of this development in the doctrine of Forms will not come into view until the end of Book 5, with the appearance of the philosopher-kings. But the myth of Er, the philosopher-kings, and the psychology of Book 4 are all plotted in advance and carefully prepared in Book 1, as we must now show.

II

So far I have been arguing that there is no evidence to support the hypothesis of an early or independent composition of Book 1. I want now to claim that this hypothesis is not only unsupported but actually contradicted by the data. Book 1 contains so many detailed anticipations of themes and theses to be developed in the later books that the suggestion that these are all due to a secondary reworking becomes implausible. There would be too little left of the ‘original’ composition to constitute an interesting hypothesis.

In order to show that Book 1 contains massive anticipation of the following books, I must now catalogue the passages in this book whose full significance emerges only if they are read proleptically, in the light of developments in Books 2–10, for which they can be seen as deliberate preparation. This technique of proleptic composition is well known from other works of Greek literature.¹⁹ Its occurrence in the *Republic* has often been recognized but, to my knowledge, the phenomenon has never been systematically studied. In order to make out the case against independent composition it will be necessary to aim at completeness for the anticipatory passages in Book 1, even though many of them are duly recorded in Adam’s commentary. For later books I can only cite a few examples to show that the technique is characteristic of the whole work.

1. Book 1 is the formal counterpart to Book 10: both are autonomous units, detachable from the rest of the work and almost exactly the same in length. This point is neutral with regard to relative date, but of interest for the care with which the *Republic* as a whole is structured.

(Items 2–4 occur in the opening conversation with Cephalus.)

2. The contrast between ‘desires and pleasures’ in discourse (*logoi*) and pleasures of the body introduced at 328d2–4 is elaborated by the reference to the pleasures of ‘sex and drinking and feasting’ at 329a6. These three bodily pleasures will turn out to characterize the third part of the psyche, the *epithumēton* in Book 4, while the desires for *logoi* will reappear as the *logistikon*. Sexual desire is compared to a ‘raving, savage master’ in the Sophocles anecdote at 329c, a conception of sex that will be

¹⁹ See the Afterword on Prolepsis, below.

echoed in Book 9 in the description of the 'tyrant *erōs*' that possesses the tyrant's soul and fills it with madness (573e5ff. This parallel was noted by Nettleship, *Lectures on the 'Republic' of Plato*, p. 15.) The increase in one kind of pleasure and desire as another decreases (328d) implies the same point of view as the famous channelling of desires in 6.485d. Another anticipation of the moral psychology of the later books can be seen in the reference to love of money, which is said not to be excessive in Cephalus (330c1). Though of course no philosopher, Cephalus thus figures as a moral type somewhat nobler than the oligarchic man of Book 7, in whose soul the love of wealth is dominant.²⁰

These allusions to Plato's moral psychology are quite subtly made, and they would not be immediately appreciated by any reader not yet familiar with Books 4–9. But once we begin to look for anticipation in Book 1, these links to later doctrine become obvious.

3. The same is true for Cephalus' insistence that a person's character (*tropos*) is the decisive factor in his or her happiness (329d3). That is precisely what Socrates will maintain in the central argument responding to Glaucon's challenge.

4. Above all, the Cephalus episode points forward to the myth of Er when the old man speaks of 'stories told about the house of Hades, how the one who has done wrong here must pay the penalty there' (330d7ff.)²¹ Adam (i.9) notes that we also have here, in the mention of *δίκη* and *ἀδικεῖν*, 'the first casual allusion to the subject of the *Republic*'.

5. Polemarchus' definition of justice, 'to render to each one his due' (*opheilomenon*, at 331e3ff., *prosekon* at 332c2), is a partial approximation to the formula later introduced by Socrates 'for each part to do its own thing'. (See 4.433a–b, etc.) The rulers of the good city are to judge lawsuits according to the principle that 'each should not be deprived of what is his own nor have what is not his own' (433e6). The closest parallel to Polemarchus' formula is at 420d4: 'rendering what is fitting to each part [of the state] we make the whole beautiful.'

6. At 335b–e Socrates, developing a thought from the *Crito*, denies that it can ever be the function (*ergon*) of anything good and just to do harm. As Adam notes (i.20) this is 'the only element... (in the discussion with Polemarchus) which reappears in a later book of the *Republic* (2.379b)', where it functions as a basic principle in Plato's theology and a rule for censoring the poets.

7. Besides marking the shift from personal to public morality that will be repeated in Book 2, the conversation with Thrasymachus contains two prefigurations of the philosopher-king. The second instance is obvious, and will be mentioned below (item 10). The first is more subtle and has not been generally noticed. When Socrates draws Thrasymachus into an initial contradiction (if the rulers make a mistake and give orders that are not in their interest, it will be both just and, by Thrasymachus' definition, also unjust to obey them), Cleitophon offers him an easy way out: what is just is simply to do whatever the rulers *believe* to be in their interest. But Thrasymachus rejects this subjectivist view of justice with contempt. His rulers, *qua* rulers, must be infallible; they will have knowledge (*epistēmē* at 340e3, *technē* at

²⁰ Cf. Reeve, *Philosopher-Kings*, p. 6: 'Cephalus is an attractive character, portrayed with delicacy and respect' (p. 6). 'Within the Kallipolis men of his natural type will reliably achieve the highest level of virtue of which they are capable' (p. 7).

²¹ The connection between Cephalus' remark about the afterlife and the concluding myth of Book 10 has often been noted. See, e.g. Wilamowitz, *Platon* ii.181; Raeder, *Platons philosophische Entwicklung*, p. 199 (who also cites Gomperz for this point); cf. Lutoslawski, op. cit., p. 273.

341d3ff.), not mere opinion, and so they will make no mistakes. As Adam sees (i.33), 'the discussion is now transferred from the region of facts into an atmosphere of idealism'. This makes Thrasymachus' position easier to refute: Socrates will show that, *qua* ruler, the ruler must pursue the welfare of his subjects and not his personal advantage. But if Plato has placed so much emphasis on Thrasymachus' strict or ideal conception of the ruler, that is not primarily to characterize Thrasymachus' position (for Thrasymachus will soon descend again to matters of fact, as Adam notes) but rather to introduce the notion of the perfect ruler, who rules with perfect knowledge.²²

8. Instead of Socrates' version of the ideal ruler, the future philosopher-king, Thrasymachus invokes the tyrant as the case of perfect injustice and supreme happiness (344a). This is the familiar anti-moral note, struck long ago by Polus in the *Gorgias*, soon to be repeated in Glaucon's praise of injustice in Book 2,²³ and finally dealt with in the portrait of the tyrant's soul in Book 9.

9. In the next argument Socrates distinguishes the *technai* from one another by their having a different capacity (*dunamis*, 346a3), producing a different product (*ergon*, 346d5) and being set over a different subject matter (346d6). This is a more complex variant on the principle for individuating *technai* by reference to their subject matter, a principle first introduced in the *Ion* (537c–538a). But here it serves directly to prepare for the distinction between knowledge and opinion in Book 5, which are presented as capacities (*dunameis*) distinguished 'by what they are set over and by what they produce' (477d1).

10. The most unmistakable anticipation of things to come in Book 1 is the reference to rulers who rule unwillingly (first mentioned at 345e3, then developed at 346e–347d). Glaucon, who has otherwise no role in the discussion of Book 1, but who will be the primary interlocutor beginning in Book 2, intervenes at this point to ask what Socrates means by the punishment that will oblige good men to rule. Socrates answers that the punishment is to be ruled by one's inferiors. 'But if a city were to be composed of good men, there would be competition for not ruling as there is now for ruling' (347d2). Adam (i.46) recognizes this as 'the first express allusion to the Ideal City in the *Republic*'. And Wilamowitz (ii.183) points out that Glaucon is introduced here with a view to his role in Book 2. The undesirability of ruling finds its fullest expression in Book 7, in the necessity for the philosopher-king to redescend into the cave from which he has been liberated. The mention here in Book 1 of the necessity or compulsion to rule (*ἀνάγκη* at 347c3, d1) and the theme of wages or reward for ruling (*μισθός* at 345e6, 347a1–b7) will both be repeatedly re-echoed in later books (*ἀνάγκη* at 3.416e2, 4.419a20, 5.463b3, 464c2; *μισθός* at 6.519e4, 520a8, e2, 521b7, and 7.539e3, 540b5). Even the moral psychology of Book 4 is delicately prefigured here in the three motives adduced as incentives for rule: moral superiority, love of honour, love of money (347a5–d2).²⁴

11. At 351c–d it is pointed out that common action, whether on the part of a city, an army, or a gang of thieves, is impossible if they are wronging one another: injustice produces hatred and hostility, whereas justice produces friendship and concord (*homonoia*). On this Adam (i.55) notes that the conception of justice to be developed in 4.433a–434e, 'is dimly outlined here'. But so far Plato's point is intuitively clear in

²² Similarly Raeder, p. 200. Reeve (p. 12) asks the right question, although he gives a different answer: 'why Plato has him (Thrasymachus) reject an obvious defence in favor of an arcane one, and why he takes such pain (in the Cleitophon episode) to advertise that rejection.'

²³ Glaucon does not mention the tyrant, but he describes the case of perfect injustice as a *τέχνη* (2.360e5–361a5), and specifies that such a man will rule in the city (362b2).

²⁴ The hint of tripartition is noted by Lutoslawski, pp. 273f. and Raeder, p. 200.

the context of Book 1, without reference to the later theory. Not so in the next section, where this reasoning is applied to the individual. In a single person injustice will also produce impotence and disunity: 'first it makes him incapable of action because of conflict and discord with himself, and then it makes him an enemy to himself and to those who are just' (352a6–8). The analogy here between discord in an unjust individual and conflict in an unjust group is not immediately illuminating. As Adam says, this argument 'implicitly assumes a psychological theory like that in Book 4, where the soul is shown to have "parts".' And by using the notions of justice and injustice in the community as a model for analysing justice and injustice in the soul, this passage in fact 'contains the undeveloped germ of the whole method and doctrine of the *Republic* (with the exception of Books 5–7).'²⁵

12. The final argument in Book 1, that justice is more profitable than injustice, depends upon the principle that each thing has its own proper function (*ergon*) (352d9ff.). As Adam points out, this will become the principle of specialization (2.369e2ff.), 'one of the cardinal principles of the Ideal State' (i.57).²⁶

13. The statement in the last sentence of Book 1, that we must know what justice is before we can know whether one who has it will be happy, defines the programme for Books 2–4. We must embark upon a new (and this time successful) attempt to define justice, in order to respond adequately to the challenge of Thrasymachus as reformulated by Glaucon and Adeimantus.

These twelve passages (excluding item 1, which is not an instance of prolepsis) account for roughly half of the twenty-seven Stephanus pages of Book 1, beginning with Cephalus' first response at 329a and continuing down to the premise and epilogue for the last argument in the book. Unless one believes in extraordinary coincidences, on the hypothesis of an independent earlier composition it will follow that these passages must all form part of the later revision, when the *Thrasymachus* was adapted to serve as proem to the *Republic*. What, then, would be left of the original dialogue? Perhaps the initial meeting of Socrates and Polemarchus,²⁷ the description of Thrasymachus, and bits and pieces of several arguments. Anyone who wishes to maintain the belief in an early dialogue on justice – for whose existence there is strictly no evidence – can claim these fragmentary items as content for their hypothesis. But it is surely simpler to suppose that Plato composed these parts at the same time as the rest of Book 1, with the plan of the whole *Republic* in view.

There is one other general consideration against the *Thrasymachus* hypothesis. There was after all a good reason for Plato not to compose an aporetic dialogue of definition 'on justice', parallel to those on courage, temperance and piety. As Wilamowitz noted, it would be difficult if not impossible to discuss the topic of justice without dealing with the controversial moral issues raised in the *Crito* and so fiercely debated in the *Gorgias*. Now Thrasymachus is a weaker figure than Calicles and his position is less forcefully expressed, so the challenge to Socratic morality is considerably stronger in the *Gorgias* than in *Republic* 1. That is why Wilamowitz (believing in the early composition of *Republic* 1 as an established fact) suggested that Plato had left the *Thrasymachus* unfinished in order to compose the *Gorgias* instead. What Wilamowitz saw was that an independent *Thrasymachus* would have been a

²⁵ Adam, i.56. Cf. Raeder, p. 201.

²⁶ David Sedley reminds me that the *εργον* concept was introduced earlier, in connection with the function of justice at 332e ff.

²⁷ But the meeting with Polemarchus leads us to the conversation with Cephalus, and items 2–4 show that this episode has been 'reworked' with the *Republic* in view.

feeble duplicate of the *Gorgias*. But a Socratic conversation that combines the theme of the *Gorgias* with the form of the dialogues of definition makes a perfect introduction to Plato's major work. And that is what we have in Book 1.

III

The first book of the *Republic* is a special case. The density here of anticipatory allusions marks it as a genuine prelude, like the overture to an opera in which all the major themes are briefly and tentatively presented. But it is easy to see that the technique of composition by preliminary hints and proleptic allusion is characteristic of the following books as well. We can illustrate this by a striking literary example, the figure of the three waves of paradox that dominates Book 5. The wave imagery is first mentioned explicitly at 457b7–c5, at the conclusion of the argument in favour of offering the same education and public career to women as to men. 'That is one wave, as it were (*ἐν ὥσπερ κύμα*), that we have escaped without being utterly swamped,' says Socrates. 'And a big one too,' says Glaucon. 'Wait until you see the next one!' responds Socrates, referring to the community of women and children. The third and greatest wave will of course be the doctrine of philosopher-kings (472a3–4, 473c6–8). With his usual acuity, Adam (i.285) notes that the wave metaphor was prepared in advance by the reference to swimming through difficulties at 453d. What he has not seen is that this image was introduced even earlier, in a different context (Book 4.441c4), providing a kind of subliminal exposure to the notion of desperate swimming, so that the next occurrence of this theme (in 5.453d) will recall the earlier passage in such a way as to make the following recognition of three waves seem natural, even inevitable.

The image of the waves is a purely dramatic device of pacing and emphasis, without specific doctrinal content. To show that this technique of ingressive, cumulative presentation is also a consistent pattern for the development of philosophical theory, I note a few key examples from Books 2 and 3.

Book 2

1. The principle of specialization, introduced with the division of labour at 369b–370c, and tentatively suggested as the locus of justice and injustice at 372a1, is recognized in Book 4 as the principle of justice (433a–b) and later referred to as an image (*eidōlon*) of justice (443c). In these two passages in Book 4, Plato reflects explicitly on the proleptic function of the initial discussion in Book 2: 'our dream has been fully realized, what we said we suspected [at 433a1–3], that at the very beginning (369bff.)... we had stumbled on a principle of justice' (443b7).

2. The psychological principles of high spirit (*thumoeides*) and love of knowledge (*philomathes, philosophon*) are introduced at 375a–376c in connection with the conceit of the philosophical watchdog, then developed in Book 3 as the basis for courage and temperance (410d–411e), before emerging as two of the three constituents of the full psychological theory of Book 4 (435e, 439d ff.). The comparison to the watchdog returns in Book 5, as part of the argument for female guardians (451d–e; cf. 466d1).

3. The unchangeability of the gods at 381c, together with their goodness (379b1), anticipates the unchangeability of the Forms (5.479a2, e7) together with the primary position of the Good (6.505a, 508e–509b).²⁸

²⁸ See Adam's note on 380e: 'The doctrine...enunciated here foreshadows, but does not presuppose, the metaphysical predominance of the Good in Book 6' (i.119).

4. The relation of image (*eidōlon*) and imitation (*mimēma*) to original or model is introduced at 382b9–10 in connection with the notion of a verbal lie as an external copy of the lie in the soul (i.e. falsehood) and then developed in Book 3 as the notion of literary and dramatic imitation (*mimeisthai*, 393c ff.).

Book 3

5. This notion is carried forward with the demand that poets be obliged to inscribe ‘the image of good character’ in their poems: τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰκόνα ἦθους at 401b2, where the separation of the adjective (‘good’) from its noun suggests ‘the image of the Good’, precisely the terms in which the sun is described at the end of Book 6 (509a9; cf. 506e3). The notion of imaging will then be extended to other levels of the Line (509e1) and the Cave (7.516a7, *eidōla*; cf. 534c5, and frequently in later books: 9.587c9, d6, 10.598b8, etc.). The *Republic* as a whole is structured by this relation of image to reality, copy to original, introduced in Book 2 (item 4 above) and developed here in Book 3.

6. The next significant use of image terminology (*eikones* at 402b5 and c6) refers first to the images of letters ‘in water or in mirrors’ (a direct prefiguration of the lowest level of the Line at 6.501a1–2) and then, by analogy, to the various kinds (*eidē*) of temperance and the other virtues: we and our guardians are not properly cultured (‘musical’) until we can recognize ‘these and their opposites wherever they occur, and can perceive them and their images as present in the things in which they are present’, i.e. present in souls for the virtues and in works of art for the images (402c). The use here of *eidē*, *eikones* and ‘being present in’ (*enonta*) is so suggestive of the terminology of Forms that some scholars, including Zeller, have been tempted to find that doctrine here. (For the nineteenth-century dispute, see Adam, i.168.) But there is no trace in this passage of transcendent Forms, and *eidōs* in the next sentence refers to a beautiful body (402d2). As Adam says, the language and imagery of this passage is only an ‘interesting... harbinger of the Ideal theory of 6 and 7’.

7. In a digression on the training of good judges at 409a–d, Plato insists that good men should not have contact with evil characters in their youth and, as a result, may be rather naïve, since they do not have a pattern (*paradeigma*) in themselves which permits them to recognize bad character in others (409b1); whereas the clever bad person will be on his guard, ‘referring to the patterns (*paradeigmata*) in himself’ (409c7), but will be oversuspicious and unable to recognize a sound character ‘since he does not have a *paradeigma* of this kind’ (409d2). These patterns in the soul represent different types of moral character (*ēthos*), not Forms. But they prepare the reader for the philosophers of Book 6, who ‘have a clear *paradeigma* in their soul’ because of their contact with the Forms (484b and c7), and are thus able, like painters with a good model, to establish and maintain just legislation in the city (484c–d). And in the interval the model city itself has been described as a *paradeigma* and compared to a painter’s representation of an ideally handsome human being (472c4–e1). The term *paradeigma* thus refers (1) to the painter’s model, (2) to the painter’s idealized picture, (3) to the psychological image of good and bad character, (4) to the good city constructed in the dialogue, and also (5) to the model of justice and goodness in the psyche of the philosopher who has access to the Forms. But the search for justice itself is the search for a *paradeigma* (472c4); and the search succeeds in discovering a city not to be found on earth but laid up in heaven as a model (*paradeigma*) for the philosopher to behold (9.592b). The ultimate model is of course (6) the Forms

themselves, 'the divine *paradeigma*' which the philosopher-artists must imitate (6.500e3). The passages in Books 3 and 5 thus provide a multi-levelled preparation, like a gradual ascent from the Cave, for the climactic image of the philosopher-king as the supreme painter who can take the Form of the Good as his *paradeigma* in order to reproduce its likeness in the city, the citizens and himself (7.540a9).

8. The two psychic principles of spirit (*thumoeides*) and love of learning (*philomathes*), first anticipated in Book 2 in the image of the philosophical dog (see item 2 above), are developed in Book 3 as capacities to be perfected by the virtues and hence as targets for the double training in music and gymnastics. It was a mistake to think that music was training for the soul, gymnastics for the body: both are for the sake of the soul (410c). Temperance and courage are produced when the principles of spirit and learning are properly harmonized and attuned (410e, 411e4–412a7). The goal of musical training is for rhythm and melody to penetrate to the inner parts of the psyche (401d6) and thus lead the young unawares to 'similarity and friendship and harmony (*symphōnia*) with noble discourse' (*kalos logos* at 401d2, 'the beauty of reason' in Grube's translation). The pedagogical strategy of Plato's educational scheme is thus the same as his artistic technique of proleptic composition: to prepare the mind by pre-theoretical images and patterns, before it is in a position to grasp the theory (*πρὶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν*, 402a2), so that when in the central books that doctrine finally comes, the soul of Plato's reader, like that of his guardian in training, will recognize the truth as something already familiar, congenial, and hence utterly convincing.

AFTERWORD ON PROLEPSIS

My notion of proleptic composition is adapted from Anne Lebeck:

The significance of a recurrent image unfolds in successive stages. ... The form which repetition or recurrence takes in the *Oresteia* is that of proleptic introduction and gradual development. ... In its early occurrences the image is elliptical and enigmatic. It is a *griphos* or riddle whose solution is strung out over the course of the individual drama or the entire trilogy. Significance increases with repetition; the image gains in clarity as the action moves to a climax. Prolepsis and gradual development of recurrent imagery, along with the corollary, movement from enigmatic utterance to clear statement, from riddle to solution, dominate the structure of the *Oresteia*. (*The Oresteia: A Study in Language and Structure* (Washington, DC, 1971), pp. 1f.)

Plato is less consistently enigmatic than Aeschylus, and there is no direct parallel in the *Republic* to the dramatic action of the trilogy. But if after 'recurrent image' we add 'and recurrent philosophical theme', the passage just quoted can also describe Plato's technique of stepwise exposition in the *Republic*. Only here the climax comes not at the end but in the middle, in the third wave that culminates in the account of dialectic and the Forms.

The *Republic* is a linear text, like the *Oresteia*. Hence the notion of prolepsis applies to these two works in much the same way. In some earlier publications and in a larger work in progress, I make use of an extended concept of prolepsis across separate dialogues. That notion is essentially more problematic and would require more discussion than is appropriate here. What the two uses have in common is the suggestion that Plato's art deliberately contrives to achieve effects of unity and connectedness (even 'intertextuality') by unusually subtle and indirect means.²⁹

University of Pennsylvania

CHARLES H. KAHN

²⁹ I am indebted to David Sedley and Mary Hannah Jones for comments on an earlier draft.